Originally Posted by Slothrop
You really do not have a clue what you're spouting on about
This is good ****. I'll explain it to you again: Although Lopez
dealt with what was found to be purely a local matter, the rule that came out of the case states the three things that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause. Follow? No amount of googling and wikipedia will save you. You're wrong, and you don't understand what you're talking about.
Boxing is an activity
that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is not purely a local matter. When a big boxing match is held, hotel rooms are booked, plane tickets purchased; people buy food in restaurants that moved in interstate commerce. It's massive. It clearly impacts interstate commerce, and therefore can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.
This may seem odd to you, I know, but the Court has found Congress can regulate all kinds of **** under the Commerce Clause. Even things you wouldn't imagine could be related to interstate commerce. In fact, it was through the commerce clause that much of the Civil Rights legislation was upheld. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel
(1964) the court found the 1964 Civil Rights Act's proscription of racial discrimination in public accommodations to be constitutional because it found that it impacted interstate commerce. In Katzenbach v. McClungs
(1964) the Court said that because a substantial portion of the food served in Ollie's Barbecue restaurant had moved in interstate commerce that the owner couldn't discriminate against black customers.
Thanks for the review session. I enjoyed it.
You really have no idea about the case you are bringing up and how it applies to the discussion at hand.
The fact that you repeat the same thing over and over really doesn't confirm you have a grasp about what you are actually talking about.
As for Heart and Katzenback, great, you can throw in Wickard too. The problem is that the courts are not set in stone and the present make up of the court for the most part has not decided that way, outside of Raich v Gonzalez, mainly because of the restrictions placed in Lopez regarding what would fall under the commerce clause. That said again, the Lopez case ammounts to a restriction of what is the Fed can do under the commerce clause.
You have yet to make a case for how boxing or its commissions fall under any of those three criteria of interstate commerce, a point I have repetedly brought up that you continue to ignore. LOL.