Originally Posted by Slothrop
This is empty nonsense and clearly demonstrates you don't understand how case law works. Wikipedia is not a law degree.
Activities that impact interstate commerce have been regulated under the commerce clause for a long, long time. It's stare decisis. Lopez did not overturn previous cases. It simply prevented the commerce clause power from being expanded.
Understand this: the reason the law in Lopez was declared unconstitutional was because carrying a gun in a school zone is not an activity that substantially impacts interstate commerce. Your reading of Lopez is entirely false.
No shit. LOL. I find it funny you talk about Wiki when I posted the text directly from the majority opinion from the Supreme Court website. LOL.
All you contentions are held in the decision by Rehnquist, which basically says that there is a point where if you can use any activity and roundaboutly justify it as a means for the Fed to use the commerce clause without limitations. He detailed why the firearm incident was not a activity that he felt could be applied, and I have simply said under the same reasoning is the reason no sport could be regulated by the Fed under the Commerce clause.
My reading isn't false at all, unless you think the text of the decision is false, but that would be confusing since you are the one that brought it up, claiming it supported your decision, when the majority opinion clearly does not.
This barely makes sense, but even interpreted charitably to be a meaningful English sentence, it's still laughably wrong.
Here's some of the actual language from the case which explains why the law was not a proper exercise of the commerce clause:
"Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995)
Again, the reason that the law in Lopez was not a valid exercise of the commerce clause was because the activity was so remote from impacting interstate commerce. Boxing matches are not remote. They directly impact commerce, as stated above. You're very, very wrong. Sorry.
Again the major reason for Lopez decision was that it was the Court limiting the commerce clause by saying the activities taken were non-economic activities, that is the main step of the law, the majority opinion further details how the Court at the time moved to limit the commerce clause, morrison confirms as well as the Army Corp of Engineers case.
You seem to ignore that.
From Rehnquist's majority opinion regarding indirect economic effect with relation to commerce clause.
In A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935), the Court struck down regulations that fixed the hours and wages of individuals employed by an intrastate business because the activity being regulated related to interstate commerce only indirectly. In doing so, the Court characterized the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce as "a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system." Id., at 548. Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress' power; activities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. Id., at 546. The justification for this formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise "there would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government." Id., at 548.