Should the US federal government step in and regulate boxing?

[JeanPaulValley]

Originally Posted by Slothrop

So are your mom's blow jobs.

[Slothrop]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

I know the criteria laid out by Lopez, and I talked about that in the last section of my post when I questioned how you would classify a boxing match as an act of interstate commerce. On top of that I even told you the case that would support that, the most current, being raich v gonzalez.

Again though, the Lopez case is primarily about the government's power (fed) to regulate non economic activities, not economic activities such as boxing matches. It also greatly limits the commerce powers of the fed.

So it is clear to me you really have no clue about what you are talking about and on top of that if you actually did get a law degree and board certified you clearly don't practice constitutional law.

You really do not have a clue what you're spouting on about This is good shit. I'll explain it to you again: Although Lopez dealt with what was found to be purely a local matter, the rule that came out of the case states the three things that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause. Follow? No amount of googling and wikipedia will save you. You're wrong, and you don't understand what you're talking about.

Boxing is an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is not purely a local matter. When a big boxing match is held, hotel rooms are booked; plane tickets are purchased; people buy food in restaurants that moved in interstate commerce; people roll into town and bet millions of dollars; people travel all over the fucking place. It's massive. It clearly impacts interstate commerce, and therefore can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.

This may seem odd to you, I know, but the Court has found Congress can regulate all kinds of shit under the Commerce Clause. Even things you wouldn't imagine could be related to interstate commerce. In fact, it was through the commerce clause that much of the Civil Rights legislation was upheld. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel (1964) the court found the 1964 Civil Rights Act's proscription of racial discrimination in public accommodations to be constitutional because it found that it impacted interstate commerce. In Katzenbach v. McClungs (1964) the Court said that because a substantial portion of the food served in Ollie's Barbecue restaurant had moved in interstate commerce that the owner couldn't discriminate against black customers.

Thanks for the review session. I enjoyed it.

[SweetHome_Bama]

Originally Posted by Slothrop

You really do not have a clue what you're spouting on about This is good shit. I'll explain it to you again: Although Lopez dealt with what was found to be purely a local matter, the rule that came out of the case states the three things that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause. Follow? No amount of googling and wikipedia will save you. You're wrong, and you don't understand what you're talking about.

Boxing is an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is not purely a local matter. When a big boxing match is held, hotel rooms are booked, plane tickets purchased; people buy food in restaurants that moved in interstate commerce. It's massive. It clearly impacts interstate commerce, and therefore can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.

This may seem odd to you, I know, but the Court has found Congress can regulate all kinds of shit under the Commerce Clause. Even things you wouldn't imagine could be related to interstate commerce. In fact, it was through the commerce clause that much of the Civil Rights legislation was upheld. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel (1964) the court found the 1964 Civil Rights Act's proscription of racial discrimination in public accommodations to be constitutional because it found that it impacted interstate commerce. In Katzenbach v. McClungs (1964) the Court said that because a substantial portion of the food served in Ollie's Barbecue restaurant had moved in interstate commerce that the owner couldn't discriminate against black customers.

Thanks for the review session. I enjoyed it.

You really have no idea about the case you are bringing up and how it applies to the discussion at hand.

The fact that you repeat the same thing over and over really doesn't confirm you have a grasp about what you are actually talking about.

As for Heart and Katzenback, great, you can throw in Wickard too. The problem is that the courts are not set in stone and the present make up of the court for the most part has not decided that way, outside of Raich v Gonzalez, mainly because of the restrictions placed in Lopez regarding what would fall under the commerce clause. That said again, the Lopez case ammounts to a restriction of what is the Fed can do under the commerce clause.

You have yet to make a case for how boxing or its commissions fall under any of those three criteria of interstate commerce, a point I have repetedly brought up that you continue to ignore. LOL.

[Slothrop]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

You really have no idea about the case you are bringing up and how it applies to the discussion at hand.

The fact that you repeat the same thing over and over really doesn't confirm you have a grasp about what you are actually talking about.

As for Heart and Katzenback, great, you can throw in Wickard too. The problem is that the courts are not set in stone and the present make up of the court for the most part has not decided that way, outside of Raich v Gonzalez, mainly because of the restrictions placed in Lopez regarding what would fall under the commerce clause. That said again, the Lopez case ammounts to a restriction of what is the Fed can do under the commerce clause.

You have yet to make a case for how boxing or its commissions fall under any of those three criteria of interstate commerce, a point I have repetedly brought up that you continue to ignore. LOL.

I explained the applicable rule, which is still, clearly, good law. You don't understand how these things work. I explained why boxing is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. You ignored it. Do you care to argue that boxing is an activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce?

[JAB5239]

Each countrys Boxing should be individually governed with one world title that all countries adhere to. World title fights should be held I Mistral locations with no fighter having a judge or ref from his own country. Controversies would be resolved by the non involved countries of any world title fights and made public so each voting country could be held accountable.

In a perfect world.

[SweetHome_Bama]

Originally Posted by Slothrop

I explained the applicable rule, which is still, clearly, good law. You don't understand how these things work. I explained why boxing is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. You ignored it. Do you care to argue that boxing is an activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce?

You explained criteria for commerce clause decisions, doesn't hold up with how you think that covers Congress in making a regulatory body for a national boxing committee.

You have not explained at all how a boxing event effects interstate commerce.

There is no aggregate effect of the individual boxing commissions, we have seen in practice how the commissions have absolutely no effect of the boxing sport nationally. I have yet to see you explain how fighters fighting in a set location consittutes interstate commerce, especially when Lopez, the case you love so much, excludes considering indirect economic effect. There are no channels with regard to boxing since it opens solely in one location. So again help me out.

[Slothrop]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

You explained criteria for commerce clause decisions, doesn't hold up with how you think that covers Congress in making a regulatory body for a national boxing committee.

You have not explained at all how a boxing event effects interstate commerce.

There is no aggregate effect of the individual boxing commissions, we have seen in practice how the commissions have absolutely no effect of the boxing sport nationally. I have yet to see you explain how fighters fighting in a set location consittutes interstate commerce, especially when Lopez, the case you love so much, excludes considering indirect economic effect. There are no channels with regard to boxing since it opens solely in one location. So again help me out.

Here, you must not have read this part:

"Boxing is an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is not purely a local matter. When a big boxing match is held, hotel rooms are booked; plane tickets are purchased; people buy food in restaurants that moved in interstate commerce; people roll into town and bet millions of dollars; people travel all over the fucking place. It's massive. It clearly impacts interstate commerce, and therefore can be regulated under the Commerce Clause."

[SweetHome_Bama]

Originally Posted by Slothrop

Here, you must not have read this part:

"Boxing is an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is not purely a local matter. When a big boxing match is held, hotel rooms are booked; plane tickets are purchased; people buy food in restaurants that moved in interstate commerce; people roll into town and bet millions of dollars; people travel all over the fucking place. It's massive. It clearly impacts interstate commerce, and therefore can be regulated under the Commerce Clause."

Using that broad an argument is what lead the the majority decision in Lopez sloth.

Rehnquist, with relation to the activities section

These are not precise formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be. But we think they point the way to a correct decision of this case. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. See supra, at 8. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel, supra, at 30. This we are unwilling to do.

The question will always come down to who is on the Court, that said I see the same problems Rehnquist and the court had with saying a firearm was an action to be regulated under the Court that I see with boxing, football, baseball, hockey, or any other sport.

Simply is no real case to say a boxing match in nevada affects a boxing match in NY or FL. Simply isn't the nature of the business.

Like I said before, Lopez itself says indirect economic action is not grounds for permitting the commerce clause, so your talks of money from hotels and other businesses is irrelevant.

[OttkeRuiz]

This is a good argument, I don't know who's right but I do know that Bama's RBR scorecards are always a fucking disgrace so I pick Slothrip

[Hermit]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

Simply is no real case to say a boxing match in nevada affects a boxing match in NY or FL. Simply isn't the nature of the business.

Clearly out of my depth on his one, but as of now, one state honors another's license and suspensions. Nevada sent Margarito back to California to get his license renewed even though the proposed fight was in Nevada. Arum pulled an end run and went to Texas but the point is, the suspension had expired and Texas was then free to issue a license. Doesn't this set precedence as far as "affects" would be concerned then?

[SweetHome_Bama]

Originally Posted by Hermit

Clearly out of my depth on his one, but as of now, one state honors another's license and suspensions. Nevada sent Margarito back to California to get his license renewed even though the proposed fight was in Nevada. Arum pulled an end run and went to Texas but the point is, the suspension had expired and Texas was then free to issue a license. Doesn't this set precedence as far as "affects" would be concerned then?

No different than different states having the ability to determine if they recognize other states concealed carry permits. Still doesn't provide the fed with the avenue to declare they have the right to implement national concealed carry licenses.

Also that is simply an event, not an effect on an industry. The industry portion of the activity would be the hard point with any sport, IMHO, with consideration of the present makeup of the Court.

[Slothrop]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

Using that broad an argument is what lead the the majority decision in Lopez sloth.

Rehnquist, with relation to the activities section


The question will always come down to who is on the Court, that said I see the same problems Rehnquist and the court had with saying a firearm was an action to be regulated under the Court that I see with boxing, football, baseball, hockey, or any other sport.

Simply is no real case to say a boxing match in nevada affects a boxing match in NY or FL. Simply isn't the nature of the business.

Like I said before, Lopez itself says indirect economic action is not grounds for permitting the commerce clause, so your talks of money from hotels and other businesses is irrelevant.

This is empty nonsense and clearly demonstrates you don't understand how case law works. Wikipedia is not a law degree.

Activities that impact interstate commerce have been regulated under the commerce clause for a long, long time. It's stare decisis. Lopez did not overturn previous cases. It simply prevented the commerce clause power from being expanded.

Understand this: the reason the law in Lopez was declared unconstitutional was because carrying a gun in a school zone is not an activity that substantially impacts interstate commerce. Your reading of Lopez is entirely false.

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

Lopez itself says indirect economic action is not grounds for permitting the commerce clause, so your talks of money from hotels and other businesses is irrelevant.

This barely makes sense, but even interpreted charitably to be a meaningful English sentence, it's still laughably wrong.

Here's some of the actual language from the case which explains why the law was not a proper exercise of the commerce clause:

"Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.


United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995)



Again, the reason that the law in Lopez was not a valid exercise of the commerce clause was because the activity was so remote from interstate commerce. Boxing matches are not remote. They directly impact commerce, as stated above. You're very, very wrong. Sorry.

[PhonyGamboa]

Keep the federal government out of here! It's already become all too powerful overtime and now has gotten involved in healthcare. The fed. govn't was always supposed to have only 2 main purposes: protect and defend it's citizens in times of war and terrorism and respond in cases of natural disaster. Regulation simply chokes and destroy business and would destroy the sport of boxing if the feds. even got to put their claws anywhere near it.

[SweetHome_Bama]

Originally Posted by Slothrop

This is empty nonsense and clearly demonstrates you don't understand how case law works. Wikipedia is not a law degree.

Activities that impact interstate commerce have been regulated under the commerce clause for a long, long time. It's stare decisis. Lopez did not overturn previous cases. It simply prevented the commerce clause power from being expanded.

Understand this: the reason the law in Lopez was declared unconstitutional was because carrying a gun in a school zone is not an activity that substantially impacts interstate commerce. Your reading of Lopez is entirely false.

No shit. LOL. I find it funny you talk about Wiki when I posted the text directly from the majority opinion from the Supreme Court website. LOL.

All you contentions are held in the decision by Rehnquist, which basically says that there is a point where if you can use any activity and roundaboutly justify it as a means for the Fed to use the commerce clause without limitations. He detailed why the firearm incident was not a activity that he felt could be applied, and I have simply said under the same reasoning is the reason no sport could be regulated by the Fed under the Commerce clause.

My reading isn't false at all, unless you think the text of the decision is false, but that would be confusing since you are the one that brought it up, claiming it supported your decision, when the majority opinion clearly does not.

This barely makes sense, but even interpreted charitably to be a meaningful English sentence, it's still laughably wrong.

Here's some of the actual language from the case which explains why the law was not a proper exercise of the commerce clause:

"Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.


United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995)



Again, the reason that the law in Lopez was not a valid exercise of the commerce clause was because the activity was so remote from impacting interstate commerce. Boxing matches are not remote. They directly impact commerce, as stated above. You're very, very wrong. Sorry.

Again the major reason for Lopez decision was that it was the Court limiting the commerce clause by saying the activities taken were non-economic activities, that is the main step of the law, the majority opinion further details how the Court at the time moved to limit the commerce clause, morrison confirms as well as the Army Corp of Engineers case.

You seem to ignore that.

From Rehnquist's majority opinion regarding indirect economic effect with relation to commerce clause.

In A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, [Only registered and activated users can see links. ], 550 (1935), the Court struck down regulations that fixed the hours and wages of individuals employed by an intrastate business because the activity being regulated related to interstate commerce only indirectly. In doing so, the Court characterized the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce as "a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system." Id., at 548. Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress' power; activities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. Id., at 546. The justification for this formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise "there would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government." Id., at 548.

[Slothrop]

Originally Posted by SweetHome_Bama

No shit. LOL. I find it funny you talk about Wiki when I posted the text directly from the majority opinion from the Supreme Court website. LOL.

All you contentions are held in the decision by Rehnquist, which basically says that there is a point where if you can use any activity and roundaboutly justify it as a means for the Fed to use the commerce clause without limitations. He detailed why the firearm incident was not a activity that he felt could be applied, and I have simply said under the same reasoning is the reason no sport could be regulated by the Fed under the Commerce clause.

My reading isn't false at all, unless you think the text of the decision is false, but that would be confusing since you are the one that brought it up, claiming it supported your decision, when the majority opinion clearly does not.




Again the major reason for Lopez decision was that it was the Court limiting the commerce clause by saying the activities taken were non-economic activities, that is the main step of the law, the majority opinion further details how the Court at the time moved to limit the commerce clause, morrison confirms as well as the Army Corp of Engineers case.

You seem to ignore that.

From Rehnquist's majority opinion regarding indirect economic effect with relation to commerce clause.

First, one of the things that you're wrong about here is the notion that Lopez curtailed the commerce clause. It didn't. It prevented it from expanding.

The power to regulate activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce was not changed:

"First, we have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal mining; Hodel, supra, intrastate extortionate credit transactions, Perez, supra, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, McClung, supra, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, and production *560 and consumption of homegrown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995)



This is very simple: boxing matches affect interstate commerce. Therefore, if Congress wanted to regulate them, it could.